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Abstract
Many findings in cognitive psychology suggest that many decisions and 
judgments rely on  processes that are unconscious, that these processes can be disrupted by 
conscious input, leading to poor decision making. A commonly paradigm has shown that 
decision makers who are distracted while deciding make better to make quick decisions . The 
distraction is thought to facilitate spontaneous unconscious processing, called the 
“deliberation without attention effect”, that lead to better decisions when the question is later 
revisited. This effect was tested in three studies on diagnostic judgments in a multiple cue 
probability learning paradigm. In three studies, the effect of rushed decision making, forced 
deliberation, and distraction were tested on probability judgments, and on choices  and 
confidence judgments. Evidence suggested that subjects in the immediate decision were less 
accurate than the other conditions, in decisions and judgments, despite higher levels of 
confidence, but equaled performance in other conditions when given make-work tasks in 
between decisions, which may have primed more careful or more deliberate thinking. The 
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Introduction
The suggestive allure of the unconscious mind has seduced philosophers and 
psychologists for centuries.  While humans have the most active conscious mind in the 
animal kingdom, much of our behavior is still at the mercy of unconscious decisions and 
action. Rene Descartes (1637) described the most basic model of this, defining as a “reflex” 
behavior triggered by certain stimuli and subject to little or no conscious control.   Seemingly 
every new branch and tradition of psychology in the past 100 years has uncovered new roles 
for mental capacities that can and do operate automatically, without conscious control - this 
trend has continued and unconscious processes have been discovered in increasingly 
complex behaviors (Gladwell, 2005). These cases are particularly interesting because despite 
influences from the unconscious, they are still experienced by consciousness, and the role of 
the unconscious can go undetected (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Daniel Kahneman (2003) has made an analogy between decision making and 
perception. In that field, the Gestalt tradition is notable for its demonstrations that what is 
perceived in consciousness is not an exact replica of the physical world, but an interpretation 
of what is sensed by the nervous system. Most of the time, this interpretation is virtually 
indistinguishable from the real thing, but research has shown that particular stimuli (visual 
illusions, such as Mach bands) can expose the shortcuts the perceptual system takes, and a 
distorted version of reality is perceived instead. Likewise with a complex decision – though 
the final choosing may be under conscious control, it rests on the assumptions and 
approximations of numerous unconscious operations. And just as with visual illusions, 
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certain kinds of decisions and contexts can elicit irrational behavior by exposing weaknesses 
in the shortcuts and algorithms of the unconscious.
Despite these weaknesses, unconscious processing is relied upon in many 
decisions, for different reasons. First, conscious deliberation can be slow, constrained as it is 
by the amount of information that can be held active in working memory at any given time 
(Miller, 1956; Evans, 2003). Many decisions must be made quickly, and in these cases a 
purely conscious approach could take into account only the most obvious information. For 
example, decision making in social situations requires near-instantaneous consideration of 
many sources of information and decision alternatives – accordingly, much of that has been 
found to be unconsciously driven (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Expert decision making often 
involves not only better deliberation, but also a well-trained unconscious that can quickly 
organize information to lighten the burden on conscious mind (Klein, 1999). Deliberation is 
also resource intensive, and the difference in utility between an optimal and a sub-optimal 
choice may be outweighed by the time, effort, and glucose spent to engage conscious 
processes (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 1999; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). So even if 
deliberation might always improve any single decision, this may be an unrealistic long-term 
decision-making strategy.
Does deliberation always improve a decision? Lay theories assume that in 
cognitive tasks, much like in physical tasks, more effort will lead to a better outcome. 
Economists similarly assume a lot about the decision makers that they model, who are seen 
to be carefully pricing and weighing every prospect for even small decisions. Behavioral 
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economists often consider conscious deliberation as the more rational strategy. Consider a 
commonly cited model, Keith Stanovich and Richard West's (2000) System 1 (unconscious) 
and System 2 (conscious).  System 2 is cast as a manager as well as a problem solver, and is 
held to account for the mistakes of System 1, as a failure of “cognitive reflection” (Frederick, 
2005). System 1, however, is the source of “predictable irrationality” (Ariely, 2008). 
Prescriptions are offered to, if not prevent unconscious decision-making altogether, then at 
least foolproof it with “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). And indeed, the heuristics and 
biases literature is filled with paradigms that highlight the failings of the unconscious, where 
a more deliberative approach would succeed (Kahneman, 2003). Research focus on 
unconscious biases is indeed warranted because they can affect decisions undetected. It is 
romantic to think that all decisions can be improved by trying harder, that a little elbow 
grease is sufficient to achieve rationality. That, however, would be an oversimplification. 
For one thing, many common decision making errors are not ameliorated by 
deliberation. Others get worse. Take the phenomenon of “verbal overshadowing” – studies in 
several paradigms show that subjects who are forced to articulate their thoughts out loud 
during certain types of decisions fare worse than those who are allowed to think in silence. 
This has been demonstrated in a wide range of tasks, such as recognizing faces (Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990), wine tasting (Melcher & Schooler, 1996), spatial mapping (Fiore 
& Schooler, 1998), and picking a decorative poster (Wilson et al., 1993). In all of these 
cases, the skill impaired by forced verbalization is typically dominated by unconscious 
factors, such as perceptual processing. 
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Verbal overshadowing goes beyond strictly unconscious processes, though. It has 
also been found to affect tasks that have verbal components, such as insight problem solving 
(Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993) and analogical reasoning (Lane & Schooler, 2004). 
Here the optimal recruitment is likely some combination of unconscious and conscious 
contributions, but forced deliberation throws the balance off, and conscious processes 
dominate. It is cases like these where verbal overshadowing can be at its most insidious – the 
superficially verbal problem can initially encourage deliberation, which recruits more and 
more conscious capabilities at the expense of the unconscious, and potentially helpful 
unconscious strategies are drowned out in a “transfer inappropriate processing shift” 
(Schooler, 2002). This kind of cascade is likely to happen in the real world when some 
amount of deliberation is already suggested by the context.
Deliberation can change not only how information is processed, but also what 
information is processed. Studies show that when deliberation is engaged, information that is 
easy to express or quantify verbally is more likely to be considered. The availability heuristic 
then leads us to give more weight to such easily-processed information (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). An example of this is the “distinction bias” (Hsee & Jiang, 2004), that 
occurs when subjects predict their affective reaction to several related outcomes – say, 
reading 10 or 25 negative words, or 10 or 25 positive words. Subjects expect that reading 10 
negative words will feel a little worse than reading 10 positive words, but a little better than 
25 negative words and much worse than 25 positive words. When people actually read words 
and rated their feelings, they indeed liked positive words more than negative words, but the 
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number of words had no effect on either set. This mistake only occurs when all options are 
evaluated at once – if they are evaluated separately, then predictions fall in line with 
experiential data. The process of comparison overweights the importance of easy-to-quantify 
information (25 is 2.5 times bigger than 10) over hard-to-quantify information (how much 
better are positive words than negative words?).  Other examples of the same phenomenon 
show that choices that are more easily justified are sub-optimally over-preferred, and many 
paradigms can trap System 2 into a bias known as “reason-based choice” (Shafir, Simonson 
& Tversky, 1992).
 The availability bias is further exacerbated by the capacity constraints of the 
conscious mind.  Information held in working memory will always be more easily retrieved, 
and this ease of retrieval is cyclically used as a cue for its relevance. Focal hypotheses are 
typically ascribed more support and are judged to be more likely than residual hypotheses 
(Koehler, White & Grondin, 2003). This can result in impossibly high frequency estimates 
when a prospect (e.g. “How many science majors are at Waterloo?”) is unpacked into its 
constituent possibilities (e.g. “How many biology, physics, chemistry, and other science 
majors are at Waterloo?”). Focusing attention on each component prospect individually 
increases the combined perceived likelihood of the whole set, which can lead the total 
probability for all outcomes well above 100% (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). More generally, 
many problems that require divergent thinking, or consideration of a lot of alternatives, are 
not suited to the constrained scope of conscious thought, and decision makers are adversely 
affected by these “narrow frames” (Larrick, 2009).  Deliberation, however, is self-
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perpetuating, and many decisions that might benefit from a step back and a broader frame 
suffer without. 
A full account of these results leads to the conclusion that lay theory is wrong, 
and that conscious deliberation is not always the best strategy. Rather, conscious capabilities 
have strengths and weaknesses just like unconscious capabilities, and many types of 
problems are dealt with better in the absence of deliberation. Conscious involvement is 
determined by several things, often by what is ideal for a task, but also by irrelevant factors, 
such as the demands of the task immediately before. And just as it is possible to deliberate 
too little on a task that demands it (such as tax returns) so one can deliberate too much when 
a task does not demand deliberation (face recognition). The metacognitive decision to recruit 
conscious and unconscious resources for decision making is an important one, and many 
questions remain about how recruitment occurs, and in what situations each are more 
capable.
A recent series of studies by Ap Dijksterhuis (2004) has drawn considerable 
attention, and a similar amount of skepticism, for demonstrating a large role for unconscious 
processes in increasingly complex decisions. The initial experiment modeled different ways 
to approach an important decision - in this case, between four apartments to rent. Subjects 
were first shown bits of either positive or negative information about each apartment (for 
example, “Apartment B has in-house laundry” or “Apartment D has a long commute”) for 
ten seconds each. Some saw four bits of information about each house (16 total) and some 
saw 12 bits (48 total). Of the four apartments, one had more positive bits than the other three, 
6
and after seeing all the bits one at a time, subjects had to decide which apartment they liked 
the best. 
At this point subjects were divided into three conditions, called “Blink”, “Think”, 
and “Sleep” (these names, not used in Dijksterhuis’ original study, were adapted from 
Newell et al., 2008). In Blink, they were given ten seconds to decide, which was meant to 
mimic a snap decision. In Think, they were given four minutes and told to deliberate through 
the whole time, which was intended to simulate a typical “think as hard as you can” strategy. 
In Sleep, subjects were supposed to make a snap decision, but only after four minutes of 
distraction – either anagrams, or the n-back task (Jonides et al., 1997). Subjects given only 
four bits about each apartment were equally likely to pick the best apartment of the four, 
regardless of condition. However, when subjects were given twelve bits, then the Sleep 
condition chose the best apartment more often than either the Blink or the Think condition. 
Subjects in a follow-up study were asked just to rate each apartment on a 10-
point scale, and the same pattern emerged – Sleep gave higher ratings to the best apartment 
than the other conditions, butonly when there were twelve bits of information per apartment. 
A final study showed than when subjects were asked to recall the bits of information instead 
of making any judgment or decision, subjects in Sleep recalled more positive bits and fewer 
negative bits about the best apartment, compared to the other conditions. Further work has 
taken this effect out of the lab and shown it in real consumer choices (Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006). Following up on initial reports, one meta-analysis has been published that found a 
less-than-significant effect in the predicted direction (Acker, 2008). However, this analysis 
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included only 17 experiments, and did not consider any moderating factors. A more 
comprehensive review of 37 studies shows a much stronger effect, and one that predictably 
varies depending on task specifics, such as the type of decision, and how the bits of 
information are presented (Strick et al., 2009). Doubts about whether Dijksterhuis' initial 
findings replicate have been, if not put to rest, then at least pacified.
The authors' proposed mechanism, however, has come under considerable 
controversy. Dijksterhuis (2004) described it as the “deliberation-without-attention effect”, 
and thought that while the conscious was occupied with anagrams, unconscious processes 
slowly worked their way through the problem. Note that this is different from merely 
avoiding the common pitfalls of deliberation – rather, the theory is that unconscious 
processes are actively helping the solution along. Dijksterhuis proposed that wide 
association-driven networks, which can be employed by conscious thought, can also turn on 
spontaneously and search for problem-relevant information without entering awareness until 
the problem is again consciously revisited (for a neuroscience perspective on these networks, 
see Christoff et al., 2010; Mason et al., 2007). Thus, when a subject is finished solving 
anagrams and returns to the problem, much of the organization of relevant information is 
already done. The authors believe that the unconscious processing sorts out which 
information is most relevant for the problem, as evinced by subjects' disproportionately 
remembering the discriminating features (good features for the good apartment, and vice 
versa) in Sleep than in Think (2004, study 5). 
Based on this mechanism, Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) proposed a “theory 
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of unconscious thought” which delineated the practical differences between deliberation 
with, and without, attention. According to their theory, unconscious thought works bottom-
up, and can handle a lot of information at once. Conscious thought, however, must rely on 
top-down rules and strategies to condense information to a manageable size, or else must 
focus on only small parts of the problem at once. Because unconscious thought can hold a lot 
of information at once, it is less susceptible to availability-based overweighting. As well, 
unconscious thought is capable of more divergent thinking, because it does not need to 
constrain the scope of relevant information for processing.
 These principles can be used to predict situations where conscious and 
unconscious thought would be more appropriate for a decision. For example, if a task does 
not depend on enough information to overburden working memory, then conscious thought 
would be better able to handle it – as the informational burden increases, however, conscious 
thought would be less and less able to manage the relevant factors, and decision quality 
would be impaired accordingly (see Figure 1). As well, linear, rule-based thinking (such as 
financial planning) would be better left to deliberation, whereas divergent thinking (such as 
brainstorming) would be better solved using unconscious thought.
These predictions have garnered some further experimental support. Dijksterhuis 
and Meurs (2006) applied the conditions (Blink, Think, and Sleep) from earlier studies to 
creative problems, asking subjects to name different cities in The Netherlands starting with 
an “a”, or to list different uses for a brick. Although the total number of answers was not 
different between conditions, Sleep prompted less typical, more divergent answers than 
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Figure 1: How complexity and quality of a decision interact in different styles of thinking 
(UT = unconscious thought, CT = conscious thought). Reprinted from Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren (2006).
10
Think or Blink. Chen-Bo Zhong and colleagues (2009) attempted to reveal the workings of 
the unconscious networks in action. Their study used the remote associates test, which is 
solved by linking three seemingly unrelated words with another word commonly paired with 
each of the three – for example, “room”, “foot”, and “meat” would all be paired with “ball” 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Subjects were given a set of nine problems, and had either 
five minutes of deliberation (Think) or five minutes of the n-back task (Sleep). Before 
solving the problems, however, subjects performed a lexical decision task, and the solutions 
to the remote associate problems were included in the word list. While there was no 
significant difference in the number of problems solved between the two conditions, subjects 
who did the n-back task responded to the remote associate solutions faster in the lexical 
decision task than did subjects who deliberated. In a second study using harder problems, 
Sleep solved fewer problems, but was just as fast as Think in recognizing the answers on the 
lexical decision task. 
A third condition in both studies was similar to the Sleep condition – however, 
subjects did not know they would later have to solve the problems during the n-back task. 
This “Mere Distraction” condition performed worse than both Think and Sleep, suggesting 
that unconscious thought must be goal-directed, that the simple passage of time was not 
enough to improve decisions. The same effect was found in a replication of Dijksterhuis' 
initial four-item-by-twelve-bit experiment with Mere Distraction, where subjects who were 
not told that they would have to solve the problem later were no better at making decisions 
than were those who deliberated (Bos et al., 2008). This Mere Distraction condition was 
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included to rule out a simple alternative account of the effect, that of “path switching” 
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995). This account suggests that the distraction task helps decisions 
not because it occupies conscious thought while the unconscious organizes relevant 
information, but because it allows irrelevant but activated information to drift from working 
memory. Vul and Pashler (2007) have shown that a period of interruption during solving 
time can improve performance for remote associate problems, but only when subjects are 
misdirected with a plausible but incorrect solution first. When subjects were not initially 
misdirected, the interruption was not helpful. A similar effect is found in consumer decisions 
- interruption can move the focus of decisions away from easy-to-quantify feasibility 
information, towards hard-to-quantify desirability information, which can improve post-
choice satisfaction (Liu, 2009). There is a large literature on incubation that needs not draw 
on Dijksterhuis' unconscious networks to explain how interrupted decisions are made. 
However, the Mere Distraction condition could distinguish deliberation without attention 
from simple path switching.
Building on this, a more comprehensive alternative account was drawn from a 
study by Payne and colleagues (2008). The authors used a superficial modification of 
Dijksterhuis' initial paradigm – instead of learning 12 pieces of information about 4 
apartments for rent, they learned the 12 potential outcomes of four lotteries (the underlying 
calculations were the same as the original). This experiment employed all three of 
Dijksterhuis' conditions (Blink, Think, and Sleep) for the same time periods (4 minutes; 10 
seconds; 4 minutes of anagrams, respectively), and added another - “Self-Paced”. In Self-
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Paced, subjects were allowed to take as much time as they wanted to give an answer. The 
average subject spent much less than four minutes (mean=48s, median=24s). In the first 
study, they found that while Sleep outperformed Blink and Think, replicating Dijksterhuis, it 
was equaled by Self-Paced. A second study used a more complex lottery system (outcomes 
were unequally weighted, unlike the evenly weighted outcomes in Study 1 of Dijksterhuis, 
2004) and showed that Self-Paced was better than all three original conditions. 
Payne et al. took this as evidence against an active unconscious. For Self-Paced 
to match Sleep in less than a fifth of the distraction time undermines the necessity of 
unconscious processes for optimal decision making. Rather, it implies that Dijksterhuis' 
effect is driven by the relative under-performance of the Think condition. A case can be 
made that forcing subjects into four minutes of deliberation for a simple decision is an 
“unusual” imposition, and unrepresentative of any real-world scenario (Larrick, 2009). 
Dijksterhuis' conclusions implicitly assume that forced deliberation is the optimal standard to 
which unconscious decision making should be compared. The results of Payne et al. suggest 
otherwise.
This account is comparable to verbal overshadowing - in both cases, a forced and 
atypical over-reliance on conscious thought has a destructive influence on decision-making. 
A meta-analysis of verbal overshadowing in face recognition showed that that the effect was 
strongest when instructions for verbalization emphasized forced elaboration, rather than 
merely asking for a free recitation of the subject's thoughts (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). But 
face recognition is usually done without deliberation - in domains where subjects have 
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experience verbalizing their thoughts, the effects are eliminated. Members of a wine tasting 
club showed no verbal overshadowing on wine tasting, because they had practice describing 
wines, and had inoculated their palates from the distorting effects of deliberation (Melcher & 
Schooler, 1996). A follow-up study taught subjects to identify mushroom species based on 
photos - some were told to describe their thoughts and theories as they learned, while others 
could learn in silence. When everyone was tested again later, subjects who had been forced 
to verbalize were no better on average than those who learned in silence, but importantly 
they were not affected by verbalization at test (Melcher & Schooler, 2004). The relevance of 
Dijksterhuis' effect is underscored by the fact that choosing an apartment is a common 
decision, but certainly his subjects were not practiced in deciding on apartments in four 
minutes, out loud, based on randomly distributed bits. While this does not discount the 
existence of his effect, it calls into question both the proposed mechanism and whether any 
of this is applicable to real-world decision making. 
In light of Payne et al. (2008), the evidence for the “goal-directedness” of 
unconscious thought may not hold. Consider that, in the Sleep condition, a subject might 
stray from the distractor task and revisit the initial problem, or simply rehearse the most 
important information. Subjects know they have to answer the question afterward, and the 
median subject would have to spend only five percent of the four minute distractor task 
(fourteen seconds) drifting, combined with the initial ten seconds, to match the amount of 
time subjects voluntarily spent in Payne et al's Self-Paced condition. No task is distracting 
enough to make fourteen seconds of off-task thought seem unreasonable, and none of 
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Dijksterhuis' studies report any accounting of subjects' performance on the intermittent 
anagrams or n-back task, that might suggest they were on task. This puts Bos and colleagues' 
(2008) claim about the “goal-directedness of unconscious thought” in a different light. A less 
charitable explanation would be that subjects who know they will be tested later end up 
drifting more often, or for longer periods. Or they drift for the same amount of time but use 
that time to reconsider the problem.
To sum up, there are many unanswered questions about Dijksterhuis' Theory of 
Unconscious Thought. First, the evidence for “polarization” of memory traces is indirect – it 
has been shown as priming for lexical decision, and in memory, but not in the decision itself. 
This is primarily a limitation of the paradigms used - Dijksterhuis' effect has been shown 
only in preference decisions (picking apartments) and problem solving (remote associates), 
where the direction of evidence is essential, and the strength of that evidence needs not be 
calibrated. An inference-based judgment task, one where calibrating the intensity of support 
for various options is just as important as identifying the direction towards which the 
evidence points, may sort this out and show polarization in a more influential (and 
potentially harmful) role. Second, Dijksterhuis’ paradigm fails to differentiate between 
unconscious facilitation and conscious impedance – a task that allowed for multiple decisions 
that varied the degree to which these factors might influence a decision might better parse the 
two competing accounts. Third, the role of conscious thought during the distraction has not 
been quantified in any way – some attempt must be made to measure performance on the 
distraction task to at least get a sense of how “goal directedness” affects conscious thought, 
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as well.
The current study attempted answers to these questions by applying the effect of 
Dijksterhuis' Blink, Think, and Sleep conditions to a multiple cue probability learning 
(MCPL) paradigm (based on White, 2006). This paradigm is an inferential diagnostic 
learning task – subjects see a set of case files that are representative samples of a distribution 
of causally related information (cues that can predict the prevalence of outcomes). From the 
set of case files, the underlying relation can be understood by comparing the co-occurrence 
of cues and outcomes. Subjects later have to apply these learned relations and diagnose the 
likelihood of all possible outcomes based on a set of cues.
This task meets many needs. First it satisfies many requirements for the 
deliberation-without-attention effect laid out by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006). Each 
diagnosis requires distilling a large set of case files, which would benefit the relatively 
unconstrained capacity of the unconscious. As well, this task is driven by unconscious-
favored bottom-up processing. The learning is from experience and not calculation, and the 
entire relational structure is learned in the task, whereas much previous information is relied 
upon in Dijksterhuis' original task (i.e., pre-existing knowledge about what apartment 
features are good or bad). Also in MCPL, the relative importance of each cue must be 
weighted properly, so that deliberation might cause attentional overweighting and give the 
unconscious a further boost. 
MCPL is flexible, and many aspects of the paradigm were tweaked to encourage 
a bottom-up exemplar-based strategy during judgment (Juslin et al., 2003a; 2003b). This was 
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thought to favor an unconscious cognitive style, and to provide ample opportunity for 
unconscious networks to outperform deliberation. For example, because the task is abstract, 
pre-existing knowledge will be relied upon less. A probabilistic structure was used, and the 
learning phase was quick, with no guessing and no feedback, which made it harder for 
subjects to form hard-fast rules to aid their later judgments. Further, probability judgments 
require understanding of both the direction and magnitude of evidence in support of one 
outcome, making it possible to measure polarization of the choice directly. These many 
judgments can also employ a diverse set of cue patterns to test a broader scope of a subjects' 
understanding.
The following three experiments attempted to find a deliberation without 
attention effect in multiple cue probability learning. All studies assigned subjects to one of 
three conditions, each a modified version of Dijksterhuis' Blink, Think, and Sleep conditions, 
and measured the effect on subjects' diagnostic judgments. All studies used the same cue 
structure and training set. Study 1 asked subjects for probability judgments and measured 
both their accuracy and perceived strength of evidence, based on the implied predictions of 
unconscious thought theory. Study 2 had subjects choose the most likely outcome and give 
confidence ratings, and measured reaction times. This was an attempt to subdivide the 
process of probability judgment into separate phases for evaluating strength and direction. 
Study 3 again used frequency judgments and had subjects in the Blink condition solve 
anagrams between judgments to compare against subjects in the Sleep condition and address 





Seventy-three subjects were recruited. Seven were excluded from the analysis for 
performance that indicated they didn’t understand the task, defined as chance-or-below 
accuracy of implicit choices (see below for an explanation of the measure). This left 66 
subjects included in the analysis.
Training Set
The MCPL structure was based on a similar one in White (2006), and was chosen 
because it had a broad but shallow level of complexity. It was broad because it had six cues 
and three outcomes, and the training set had 246 case files, meaning subjects would have to 
handle a lot of information at once. It was shallow because cue diagnosticity was predictable, 
and easy to estimate if the right evidence from the training set is recalled. The cues were 
conditionally independent, i.e., conditioned on a particular outcome, the probability of 
observing a particular cue value was independent of the value of the other cues. All cues 
were either high diagnostic (paired with an outcome 4.0 times as often as without) or low 
diagnostic (paired 1.7 times as often) with a high and low diagnostic cue associated with 
each of the three outcomes. It was thought that had the problem space been less broad and 
involved fewer cues or outcomes, it might not have overloaded the capacity of conscious 
thought. Further, had the problem space been deeper, with a more complex cue structure (cue 
dependence, or other non-linear relations), it would have been unsolvable without active 
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hypothesis testing and rule generation, which are typically associated with conscious thought 
(Juslin et al., 2003b)1. The probabilities of each outcome given each cue are summarized in 
Table 1.
According to the predetermined diagnosticity levels, the probabilities of each cue 
given each outcome were calculated, as well as the probability of every potential 
combination of the six cues. Each outcome was equally likely. The probability of each 
potential case file (the set of six binary cue values plus one of three diagnoses) was compiled 
and extrapolated to a total set of 300. The occurrence of each case file was rounded to a 
whole number (because it is impossible to show only a fraction of a case file). As well, the 
39 case files in the training set that matched those used in the multi-cue test set (which are 
described below) were removed from the final set. These case files all contained the same 
cue pattern (two high diagnostic cues, one low diagnostic cue) so low diagnostic cues are 
present slightly more often (131 cases each) than high diagnostic cues (114 cases each)2. 
Table 2 shows the resulting cue dependence matrix. Values indicate the ratio of the actual 
hypothetical likelihood assuming cue independence (which in this case means before 
rounding and removal of test cases). The only ratio noticeably different from 1 results from 
the set of missing cues – because the removed exemplars all have two high diagnostic cues 
and an outcome agrees with one of them, the remaining outcome that disagrees with both
1Initially the diagnosticity levels were set lower (high: 2.0 times as likely; low: 1.3 times as 
likely) but pilot testing indicated that this was too difficult, and a majority of subjects did not 
perform above chance level. 
2These cases were left out due to an initial interest in whether novel test case files would be 
handled differently than those that were included in the training set. The results, however, 
were not informative, so this particular comparison was excluded from the analysis below.
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Table 1. Frequency of each cue given each outcome in the final training set. Each outcome 
has two associated cues – #1 with cues A and D, #2 with cues B and E, and #3 with cues C 
and F. The cues are organized, with one of each pair a highly diagnostic cue (cues A, B and 
C; p(Flu/Cue)/p(Flu|not(Cue) = 4) and the other a low diagnostic cue (cues D, E and F; 
p(Flu/Cue)/p(Flu|not(Cue) = 1.74)
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Flu1 Flu2 Flu3 Total
CueA 76 19 19 114
CueB 19 76 19 114
CueC 19 19 76 114
CueD 61 35 35 131
CueE 35 61 35 131
CueF 35 35 61 131
Total 82 82 82 246
Table 2: Cue independence ratios in the training set. Values indicate deviations of flu 
likelihood given each cue pairing, from assumed independence. All values fall close to 1 (no 
deviation) indicating that rounding and case file removal would have little impact on 
subjects' perceived cue-outcome relationships. Note that the largest deviation, 1.36, is for the 
single least likely cue-flu combination, and while the ratio of the deviation is high, the 
absolute value is very small.
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Cue Pairing Flu Strain1 2 3
AB 1.02 1.02 1.36
AC 1.02 1.36 1.02
BC 1.36 1.02 1.02
AD 0.97 0.99 0.99
BE 0.99 0.97 0.99
CF 0.99 0.99 0.97
AE 1.02 0.99 1.11
AF 1.02 1.11 0.99
BD 0.99 1.02 1.11
BF 1.11 1.02 0.99
CD 0.99 1.11 1.02
CE 1.11 0.99 1.02
DE 1.04 1.04 1.00
DF 1.04 1.00 1.04
EF 1.00 1.04 1.04
 becomes slightly more likely than the training set should predict – but the overall magnitude 
is trivial (even with this boost the disagreeing outcome would happen 0.79 times out of 100). 
The rest of the comparisons  the distortion imposed on the training set from the ideal 
distribution, due to rounding and the removal of certain case files, is minimal.. Thus the 
impact of these distortions on measured performance was considered negligible.
Procedure
All subjects completed the study in the lab using a program developed with the 
E-Prime 1.5 Suite (Schneider et al, 2008). The program first detailed a hypothetical scenario 
– subjects were to imagine they were doctors in a small town during an outbreak of flu, 
which has been shown to be caused by three separate virus strains, labeled “Russian Flu”, 
“Brazilian Flu”, and “Nigerian Flu”. They were told that six symptoms had been consistently 
observed in patients – upset stomach, dizziness, fever, headache, cough, and sore throat – 
and that while the presence or absence of any one symptom did not wholly determine the flu 
strain present, each was more likely to appear for some strains than others. It was further 
explained that the training set was a randomly selected series of case files, where the 
symptoms present at time of checkup were listed with laboratory analysis that had confirmed 
the flu strain. Their task, as doctors, was to use these case files to estimate the likelihood of 
each flu strain given information about a patients' symptoms. They were told that once they 
had seen the training set, they would later diagnose patients based on their symptoms, 
although the specific phrasing of the diagnosis (frequency estimates instead of single choices 
or probability estimates) was not described until later.
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The design of the case file, like the design of the training set itself, was guided to 
maximize the potential for exemplar-based decisions later on. Each cue was presented in the 
same part of the screen each time. Present cues were printed in navy blue and all-caps, 
whereas absent cues were printed in maroon and lower case. Each flu strain was color coded 
– Brazilian in yellow, Nigerian in green, and Russian in red. An example case file is 
presented in Figure 2. Each case file was shown on-screen for six seconds, and nothing 
separated each case file from the next. Every subject saw the same training set in the same 
pseudo-random order - no significant trends were present, i.e. particular cues, outcomes, and 
cue-outcome pairings were not clustered towards the beginning or the end of the set.
When the 246 case files had all been shown, subjects diagnosed a test set of case 
files. The test set is shown in Table 3. Three types of symptom patterns were chosen: six 
“multi-cue” case files with three cues present, six “single cue” case files with one cue 
present, and a final case file with all six cues present. Each multi-cue case file had an 
agreeing low and high diagnostic cue paired with a contrasting high diagnostic cue, while the 
single cue case files had each cue present once. Further, each set of six was orthogonally 
balanced to equally sample knowledge for all cues. The order was constant for all subjects, 
and all the single cue test cases were presented after the multiple cue cases - it was thought 
that diagnosing a symptom with no other cues present would be simple to combine and 
would thus set a stronger anchor for later multiple cue judgments, than in the reverse order, 
where multi-cue judgments would require more deconstruction to serve as an effective 
anchor for single cue judgments.
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Figure 2: A screen shot example of a case file from the training set.
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Table 3: Summary of test set case files. The most likely outcome, and all cues that agree with 
it, are in dark gray, while disagreeing cues and the associated outcomes are in light gray. The 
set is presented in order, and divided in two – first six multi-cue trials and then six single cue 
trials.
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Cues Present C o r r e c t A n s w e r
Test Order A B C D E F p (F lu 1 ) p (F lu 2) P (F lu 3)
1 x x x .8 82 .7 1 6 .5
2 x x x 82 .7 .8 1 6 .5
3 x x x 1 6 .5 .8 82 .7
4 x x x .8 1 6 .5 82 .7
5 x x x 82 .7 1 6 .5 .8
6 x x x 1 6 .5 82 .7 .8
7 x 4 .3 4 .3 9 1 .3
8 x 9 1 .3 4 .3 4 .3
9 x 7 1 .4 1 4 .3 1 4 .3
10 x 1 4 .3 7 1 .4 1 4 .3
11 x 1 4 .3 1 4 .3 7 1 .4
12 x 4 .3 9 1 .3 4 .3
13 x x x x x x 33 .3 33 .3 33 .3
Diagnoses were elicited as frequencies - “Imagine 100 patients had this set of 
symptoms. How many of the 100 would have (Brazilian/Nigerian/Russian) Flu? 
_________”. It has been argued that frequencies are a more intuitive way of representing 
fractions of outcome distributions than probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Each of 
the three values was elicited sequentially, and subjects were prompted to re-enter all three if 
the total did not match 100. The test case files were presented in exactly the same format as 
the training case files, except that where previously the flu diagnosis had been given, instead 
the screen read “unknown” in all-caps and bright red. This was to encourage any spatially-
based exemplar memory retrieval – information given visually has been shown to encourage 
association-based thinking (Juslin et al., 2003a; Strick et al., 2009)
The test phase was divided into three between-subject conditions. These were 
designed to mimic the three conditions used in Dijksterhuis' (2004) initial studies, but were 
adapted along three lines to accommodate MCPL. These adaptations are summarized in 
Table 4. First, as mentioned earlier, subjects made multiple decisions. Second, the cues were 
left on screen for the duration of the Think condition. It was thought that keeping the 
information on screen would encourage subjects to stay on task.  However, Dijksterhuis had 
given no information during this time. That being said, remembering the cue values is not the 
difficult part of MCPL – the cue-outcome relations learned from the training set are more 
focal. The amount of assistance given by this information is small – the analogy to 
Dijksterhuis would be if he had written on a piece of paper “low rent apartments are better
than high rent apartments” and given it to subjects in Think. Finally, the time allotted to the 
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Table 4: Summary of changes in decision context to adapt the manipulations of Dijksterhuis 
(2004) to the multiple cue probability learning task used in Study 1.
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condition 10 s w/ cue values 10 s, no information
Think
condition 100 s w/ cue values 240 s, no information
Sleep
condition
10 s w/cue values,
90 s of anagrams 240 s of anagrams
 
Sleep and Think conditions was shortened – instead of deliberating for 4 minutes (240 
seconds), Think subjects were given 100 seconds. Sleep subjects were shown the case file for 
10 seconds and then were asked to solve anagrams for 90 seconds, which balanced the total 
time subjects in the two conditions had between initial case file exposure and the prompt for 
solution.  
The anagrams were presented on an otherwise blank screen, and subjects were 
given a text box to enter their guesses. They advanced to the next puzzle on the list only once 
they had solved the previous one. The anagrams were all common five- and six-letter words, 
and they were chosen to be particularly easy. The reason for this was two-fold – the 
anagrams were meant merely to distract the subjects and not to tax them to any great deal. 
Also, it was also thought that if subjects spent a long amount of time on any one anagram, 
they were more likely to drift away 
from the task, and possibly re-engage the diagnosis task. Thus, is was decided that subjects 
would be more focused while solving a lot of easy anagrams, rather than fewer hard 
anagrams. The  length of the block of anagrams was decided upon for practical reasons (the 
entire experiment had to fit into hour-long blocks for the subject pool). However, unlike the 
original experiment, subjects here made multiple decisions, so over time the compounded 
processing of information from the training set would well exceed 4 minutes. No studies to 
date have systematically compared how these factors interact with the deliberation-without-




Performance in the test phase was the main dependent variable, but it can be 
measured in several ways.  Two are used for analysis here. The first is “mean absolute 
deviation”, or MAD. This was calculated by first tallying the absolute differences between 
the correct probability of a given outcome and the subject's answer. These were averaged 
across all three outcomes on a given test case to produce a final MAD score.  This method 
employs a linear loss function, so that the difference between missing the correct answer by 
50 and 51 is the same as the difference between missing by 2 and 3. Other measures, such as 
averaging within-subject correlations, or scoring deviation with different loss functions, were 
considered but are not reported here – there were no meaningful differences in the qualitative 
pattern of results based on these other scoring measures and the one used. 
The other performance measure, “implied choice accuracy” made fairly basic 
assumptions about subjects' frequency estimates. That is, if subjects were asked not to give a 
frequency estimate for 100 people, but to guess the single most likely flu for a case file, it is 
assumed that they would choose the flu for which they had assigned the largest frequency 
estimate.  Implied choice accuracy is scored as the proportion of case files for which this 
assumed choice matches the correct most likely flu. If a subject had judged two outcomes as 
equally frequent in a given case file population (e.g. a 50-50-0 response), and one of the two 
was the correct most likely flu, it was further assumed that had they been forced to pick a 
single flu, they would be equally likely to choose the correct one as the incorrect one. Thus, 
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these responses were scored as half correct (0.5 out of 1). 
MAD score was intended to represent both a subjects' ability to identify the 
valence of the case file (towards which flu the evidence pointed), and the strength of that 
evidence (the difference in frequency between the least and most likely outcomes). Implied 
choice accuracy, on the other hand, was intended to represent subjects' ability to identify the 
valence of the evidence while ignoring the strength of that evidence. These different 
measures could potentially be used to test Dijksterhuis’ proposed mechanism, memory 
polarization. If a more polarized memory of the training set were recalled during a judgment, 
this should be reflected in the strength of evidence in favor of a given hypothesis, but not 
necessarily the direction of the evidence. So by parsing these two components of probability 
judgment, polarization might be measured in addition to (and perhaps, in the absence of) a 
general benefit in accuracy. Attempts to capture the strength alone are detailed below.
Mean Absolute Deviation
The average MAD across all thirteen test cases is plotted in Figure 3. The results 
were statistically compared using between condition unpaired Student's T tests, which 
showed a significant effect of condition – Blink had a higher MAD score (m=18.81; 
MSE=1.33), and thus poorer accuracy, than Think (m=14.15; MSE=1.31; t(48)=2.42, 
p=0.015, two-tailed) or Sleep (m=15.04; MSE=1.63; t(38)=1.81, p=0.078, two-tailed). This 
pattern was consistent across both types of case files – the trend of effects by condition was 
similar in both single cue test cases  (Blink: m=17.07, MSE=1.39; Think: m=12.7, 
MSE=1.36; Sleep: m=14.24, MSE=1.70) and multi cue test cases (Blink: m=21.03, 
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Figure 3:  Mean absolute deviation of judgments in Study 1. Blink had a higher MAD score, 
and was thus less accurate (m=18.81; MSE=1.33) than Think (m=14.15; MSE=1.31) or 
Sleep (m=15.04; MSE=1.63)
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MSE=1.78; Think: m=16.80, MSE=1.74; Sleep: m=16.64, MSE=2.18), and no statistical 
tests of interaction effects approached significance.
Implied Choice
The proportion of correct implied choices across conditions is shown in Figure 4. 
The results were again analyzed using between-condition t-tests, and similar to MAD scores, 
Blink (m=0.724; MSE=0.037) was marginally less likely to answer test cases correctly than 
Think (m=0.81; MSE=0.036; t(48)=1.71, p=0.093, two-tailed) or Sleep (m=0.83; 
MSE=0.045; t(38)=1.81, p=0.078, two-tailed). The effect of condition on accuracy of 
implied choices did not vary across type of test case, with similar differences in single cue 
test cases (Blink: m=0.77, MSE=0.039; Think: m=0.86, MSE=0.039; Sleep: m=0.84, 
MSE=0.048) and multiple cue test cases (Blink: m=0.68, MSE=0.048; Think: m=0.77, 
MSE=0.047; Sleep: m=0.81, MSE=0.059).
Extremity
Apart from comparing subjects' answers to the correct Bayesian probabilities for 
each test case, across-case patterns were analyzed to get a sense of consistent judgment 
errors or tendencies. Specifically, interest was directed towards the degree of diagnosticity 
that subjects attributed to case files, that is, how much the predicted probability distribution 
differed from the base rate (which was equal frequency for all three flu strains). Because this 
analysis attempted to measure the strength of evidence, not the direction, only responses 
from subjects who knew
 which flu was most likely for a particular case (that is, were correct in the implied choice) 
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Figure 4: Accuracy of implied choices in Study 1, measuring subjects' ability to determine 
towards which outcome the evidence pointed.  Blink (m=0.72; MSE=0.04) was worse at this 
than Think (m=0.81; MSE=0.04) and Sleep (m=0.83; MSE=0.04).
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were included. Extremity scores were calculated by subtracting the correct likelihood from 
the judged likelihood of the most likely flu. This was done to take into account the fact that 
some case files were more diagnostic than others, and had different correct likelihoods A 
score of zero would indicate exact identification of the strength of the evidence towards the 
focal hypothesis. Positive numbers indicate overextremity of judgments, and negative 
numbers underextremity.
The analysis of extremity in Study 1 was suggestive. There were no significant 
differences between conditions on extremity averaged across all test case types (Blink: m=-
7.19, MSE=2.40; Think: m=-5.46, MSE=2.38; Sleep: m=-0.74, MSE=3.31; all ps >0.12). 
Because what was considered over- and under-extreme varied with each test case type, the 
extremity of judgments was analyzed by test case type, of which there were three – six 
multiple cue cases; three single high-diagnosticity cue cases; and three single low-
diagnosticity cue cases. These comparisons are shown in Figure 5. No significant differences 
were found between conditions in single, high-diagnosticity cue case files (Blink: m=-5.37, 
MSE=2.77; Think: m=-1.43, MSE=2.38; Sleep: m=-0.74, MSE=3.31, all ps >0.3), or in 
multiple cue case files (Blink: m=-12.97, MSE=2.82; Think: m=-9.36, MSE=2.46; Sleep: 
m=-6.65, MSE=3.72; all ps >0.18); however on single, low-diagnosticity cue test cases, 
Sleep made more extreme judgments (m=12.08, MSE=3.99) than both Blink (m=0.9 
MSE=3.38; t(38)=2.06, p=0.046, two-tailed) and Think (m=-2.89, MSE=3.99; t(40)=2.57, 
p=0.014, two-tailed). 
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Figure 5: Between-condition comparisons of judgment extremity in Study 1. Only test cases 
on which the implied choice would be accurate were included. No significant differences 
were found in high-diagnosticity single cue case files (Blink: m=-5.37, MSE=2.77; Think: 
m=-1.43, MSE=2.38; Sleep: m=-0.74, MSE=3.31), or multiple cue case files (Blink: m=-
12.97, MSE=2.82; Think: m=-9.36, MSE=2.46; Sleep: m=-6.65, MSE=3.72), however on 
low-diagnosticity single cue test cases, Sleep made more extreme judgments (m=-0.94, 
MSE=4.06) than both Blink (m=0.9 MSE=3.38) and Think (m=-2.89, MSE=3.99). 
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Discussion
The results of Study 1 do not suggest that multiple cue probability learning 
benefits from a deliberation-without-attention effect. A 90-second distraction did not foster 
better judgments than a similar period of deliberation. However, both were better than 
judgments made after only ten seconds of deliberation. These results were consistent both for 
the simple criterion of identifying the most likely outcome, and for calibrating judgments 
based on the diagnosticity of the cue pattern. This was contrary to the prediction, based on 
Dijksterhuis’ theory and experiments, that subjects who were distracted would be more 
accurate than those who we given that time to deliberate.
While accuracy was similar between Think and Sleep, the pattern of judgment 
was different – subjects who were distracted produced probability estimates that were more 
extreme than those who deliberated, either for a short or a long amount of time. While this 
was predominantly found in low-diagnostic single cue case files, this was reasoned to be the 
result of a ceiling effect. There was little margin for subjects to overestimate the extremity of 
the high-diagnosticity single cue case files - p(most likely flu) = 0.91 – or the multiple cue 
case files – p(most likely flu) = 0.82. This finding fit the predictions based on Dijksterhuis’ 
theory of unconscious thought - extremity of probability judgments might be the result of the 
same unconscious processes that polarize the memories of Dijksterhuis’ subjects in Sleep. 
Subjects might often try to figure out the most likely flu first – once one is identified, 
supporting information might be given more weight than contradictory information. Thus, 
the roots of extremity might lie in a process secondary to identifying in which direction the 
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evidence points. Note that Dijksterhuis’ paradigm had no conception of the “correct” amount 
of polarization – the magnitude of difference in preference between the apartments was of no 
concern, merely that the best ones were chosen more often than the others. As such, 
polarization may facilitate choices, but not necessarily help with probability judgments. This 
may explain the presence of polarization but absence of better decision-making in Study 1.
 To square these results with a deliberation-without-attention effect, consider the 
differences between this task and Dijksterhuis’ original task. Probability judgment requires a 
deeper level of analysis than choosing a preferred apartment, or rating apartments on a scale 
from 1 to 9 on how they are liked. In these preference-based tasks, the relation between the 
cue (apartment feature) and outcome (amount of liking) is straightforward – everyone knows 
that a shorter commute or lower rent is better. However, in the current task memory of the 
cues is not enough, and the weighing of the evidence is a crucial step in producing the final 
judgments. This extra step may engage conscious thought on relatively friendly ground, and 
the interference of attentional overweighting may apply to all three conditions, since subjects 
in each must apply some conscious direction towards producing final point estimates of 
probability on each trial. Thus the task may not, allow for much unconscious influence no 
matter what condition.
Study 2 attempted to address these questions by modifying the MCPL paradigm 
to separate this two-stage process into separate decisions, instead of deriving both extremity 
and accuracy from a single set of judgments. First, subjects would make choices instead of 
probability judgments and then, as a measure of the strength of evidence, would give 
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confidence judgments. Both of these were elicited in a non-numerical way, so that Sleep and 
Blink would command as little analytical thinking as possible. It was hoped that this would 
allow deliberation without attention to improve choices unimpeded. An added advantage of 
choice elicitation was that responses could be given with a single keystroke, and did not 
require any math (summing three numbers to 100), so that reaction times could be measured 
and analyzed as a meaningful representation of the amount of time required for a decision, 





67 subjects were recruited through the University of Waterloo Research 
Experiences Group. Subjects were compensated with course credit. 8 subjects were excluded 
from the analysis for exceptionally poor performance, defined as chance-or-below accuracy 
of implicit choices(as in study 1) so that 59 subjects remained.
Materials
Study 2 was similar to Study 1, with some alterations. The underlying cue 
structure and training set were the same as in Study 1. However, changes were made to the 
test phase of the paradigm. The set of test cases was almost identical, with the only change 
being that the final case, where all cues are present, was removed. The remaining twelve 
were presented in the same order as in Study 1. A minor change was implemented in the 
Sleep condition – during the distraction phase, subjects were allowed to skip an anagram if, 
after ten seconds, they did not produce a solution. This was intended to keep subjects 
engaged, even if they got stuck on a particularly difficult anagram.
In Study 2 subjects made choices instead of frequency estimates. They were 
asked to pick the single flu that was most likely given a case file. The amount of time 
allowed for each choice was the same as in Study 1: subjects in the “blink” condition were 
presented each case file for 10 seconds before the decision screen came on; Subjects in the 
“think” condition were given each case file for 100 seconds before they were able to enter 
their decision; and subjects in the “blink” condition saw each case file for 10 seconds and 
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then solved anagrams for 90 seconds before the decision screen. The decision screen was 
modified slightly from Study 1 – because subjects only had to choose one of the three 
outcomes, and not enter any numbers, responses were entered by pressing individual keys - 
“r” for Russian flu, “n” for Nigerian flu, or “b” for Brazilian flu. 
In addition to choosing the most likely flu for each case file, subjects were also 
asked for confidence ratings. Immediately after each choice, subjects were asked to indicate 
their confidence in the previous choice. Confidence was mapped onto a non-numerical scale 
based on the middle row of the keyboard, where a response of “a” was labeled “a total guess” 
and a response of “l” was labeled “absolutely sure”. The non-numerical scale was used to 
make confidence judgments as intuitive and quick as possible. There was concern that any 
extra time subjects spent contemplating their knowledge outside of the window in which they 
actually deliberated their choices might dilute the effects of the manipulation. As well, the 
confidence measure was supposed to represent momentary post-choice confidence, and not 
be tainted by overall task confidence, or personal feelings of competence. That being said, no 
explicit time pressure was placed on confidence judgments. A summary of relevant 
comparisons to Dijksterhuis’ initial study can be found in Table 5.
Finally, reaction times for both the initial answer and the confidence judgment 
were recorded, unlike in Study 1. This was to address the concern that subjects in the Blink 
or Sleep conditions were using as much time as the Think conditions, which we could not 
have controlled for in Study 1 because of the nature of the response.
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Table 5: Summary of changes in decision context to adapt the manipulations of Dijksterhuis 
(2004) to the multiple cue probability learning task used in Study 2.
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condition 10 s w/ cue values 10 s, no information
Think
condition




10 s w/cue values,




Accuracy was the fraction of the 12 test cases for which a subject correctly 
identified the most likely flu given the set of symptoms. Analysis applied the Student's T-test 
to the between condition pairwise comparisons and found no significant differences between 
conditions (Blink: m=0.74; MSE=0.04; Think: m=0.75; MSE=0.07; Sleep: m=0.72; 
MSE=0.05; all ps >0.1). Choice accuracy was broken down by case type – again no 
significant differences were found between conditions in accuracy on either the multi-Cue 
(Blink: m=0.68; MSE=0.05; Think: m=0.70; MSE=0.08; Sleep: m=0.69; MSE=0.05; all ps 
>0.1), the Single-High (Blink: m=0.92; MSE=0.05; Think: m=0.91; MSE=0.05; Sleep: 
m=0.83; MSE=0.04; all ps >0.1), or the Single-Low (Blink: m=0.67; MSE=0.06; Think: 
m=0.67; MSE=0.11; Sleep: m=0.67; MSE=0.06; all ps >0.1) trials.
Confidence
Although responses for confidence were given on a non-numeric scale, the scale 
was re-coded for analysis onto a linear numerical scale from 1 to 9 (where “a”=1, “s”=2, 
“d”=3, etc.). Overall group means are shown in Figure 6. Confidence judgments were 
analyzed using between-condition Student's T tests, which showed Blink (m=6.64; 
MSE=0.36) had higher confidence than Think (m=5.80; MSE=0.34; t(32)=1.71, p=0.097, 
two-tailed) and Sleep (m=5.73; MSE=0.29; t(39)=1.98, p=0.055, two-tailed). These results 
were broken down by case file – Figure 7 shows that the Blink condition increased 
confidence on single cue trials (m=6.93; MSE=0.42) over Think (m=5.73; MSE=0.40; 
t(32)=2.12, p=0.042, two-tailed) and Sleep (m=5.43;MSE=0.34; t(39)=2.85, p=0.007, two-
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Figure 6. Average confidence ratings by condition in Study 2.  Blink (m=6.54; MSE=0.37) 
had higher confidence than Think (m=5.66; MSE=0.31) or Sleep (m=5.64; MSE=0.25).
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Figure 7: Confidence by condition and case file type in Study 2.  Blink condition 
significantly increased confidence on Single-cue judgments (m=6.93; MSE=0.42) over Think 
(m=5.73; MSE=0.44) and Sleep (m=5.43; MSE=0.28). However, there were no significant 
differences between conditions on the multiple cue trials (Blink: m=6.37; MSE=0.4; Think: 
m=5.87; MSE=0.33; Sleep: m=6.03; MSE=0.26)
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tailed). However, there were no significant difference between conditions on the multiple cue 
trials (Blink: m=6.34; MSE=0.38; Think: m=5.87; MSE=0.35; Sleep: m=6.03; MSE=0.30; 
all ps >0.3).
Choice Reaction Times
Reaction times for each choice question are plotted in Figure 8. Subjects 
responded much slower to the first question (m=9429ms; MSE=2467ms) than to questions 2-
12 (m=3056ms; MSE=107ms). This is likely an artifact, as subjects took extra time the first 
go around to get familiar with the response keys. For this reason, question 1 was excluded 
from reaction time analysis. Subjects in the Blink condition took significantly less time to 
respond 
(m=1554ms; MSE=245ms) than subjects in the Think (m=3290ms; 
MSE=3849ms; t(32)=2.89, p<0.01, two-tailed), and Sleep (m=3849ms; MSE=342ms; 
t(39)=3.32, p<0.01, two-tailed) condition. This pattern was consistent across both multi-cue 
trials (Blink m=1815ms; Think m=2908ms; Sleep m=4293ms) and single cue trials (Blink 
m=1336ms; Think m=3608ms; Sleep m=3479ms). 
Confidence Reaction Times
Reaction times for confidence judgments were also measured. The keyboard 
mapping for confidence was novel, and while it was explained prior to confidence judgment 
1, subjects were clearly still learning how to express their confidence appropriately. As such, 
the learning curve was even steeper than for choice questions – reaction times for question 1 
(m=11423ms; MSE=6932ms) were much higher than for the remaining questions 
45
Figure 8: Reaction times for choice questions in Study 2. Subjects spent extra time on 
question 1 (m=9429ms; MSE=2467ms) learning the keyboard mapping for responses, so 
only questions 2-12  (m=3056ms; MSE=107ms) were analyzed.
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Figure 9: Reaction times for confidence judgments by condition in Study 2. Subjects in Blink 
condition responded faster (m=1277ms; MSE=167ms) than subjects in Think (m=2029ms; 
MSE=302ms) or Sleep conditions (m=2217ms; MSE=140ms).
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(m=1905ms; MSE=1484ms). To minimize this issue, question 1 was again excluded from 
analysis. Group means for the remaining 11 confidence judgments are shown in Figure 9. 
Blink subjects again answered faster (m=1277ms; MSE=167ms) than subjects in Think 
(m=2029ms; MSE=302ms; t(32)=2.55, p=0.016, two-tailed) or Sleep (m=2217ms; 
MSE=140ms; t(39)=2.74, p<0.01, two-tailed) conditions.  This pattern was consistent across 
both multi-cue trials (Blink m=1551ms; Think m=2514ms; Sleep m=2558ms) and single cue 
(Blink m=1049ms; Think m=1626ms; Sleep m=1933ms) trials.
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Discussion
Study 2, like Study 1 before it, did not find evidence for a deliberation without 
attention effect. Subjects were equally likely to correctly identify the most likely flu in all 
three conditions, and even the advantage that deliberation and distraction had over quick 
decisions was erased. This lends even more skepticism that this particular MCPL paradigm 
benefits from distraction. As well, the relation between polarization and confidence was not 
as predicted. Subjects in Blink were the most confident, while there was no difference 
between Think and Sleep. The high confidence for Blink was primarily found in single cue 
trials. This is likely the result of the surprisingly short amount of time that subjects spent 
thinking about the question. The experimental paradigm allowed them to take as long as they 
wanted after the prompt, but Blink subjects responded fast even compared to the Think 
condition, which had been staring at the information for the problem for a full 100 seconds 
before the prompt. This fast responding carried over even into confidence judgments. This 
did not affect decision performance, however. This is likely because subjects were instructed 
to be “as accurate as possible” on the decisions, but this was not explicitly stated. There was 
likely a carry-over effect, where subjects who had been working on anagrams or the choice 
would take extra time to calibrate their confidence and those who had been going through the 
experiment quickly would not take care to make accurate confidence judgments– this effect 
is not unlike transfer inappropriate processing.
The results of Study 2 were disconcerting, as the expected carry-over of 
extremity into confidence did not hold. As such, it was decided to replicate Study 1 to get a 
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better sense of what caused extremity differences between conditions. In addition, several 
methodological concerns would be addressed that had not been addressed in Study 1. The 
modified anagram task used in Study 2 would be applied in Study 3. Also, anagram 
performance was measured, to address a longstanding concern about the use of subjects’ time 
over the distraction period. As a control group to compare against, Blink subjects were asked 
to do anagrams in between test case files. This also had the effect of (roughly) balancing the 
total time that each subject spent in the experiment, forcing subjects in the Blink condition to 





103 subjects were recruited through the University of Waterloo Research 
Experiences Group. Subjects were compensated with course credit. Eleven subjects were 
excluded from analysis for exceptionally poor performance, defined as chance-or-below 
accuracy of implicit choices (as in Study 1), leaving 92 subjects in the final analysis.
Materials
Study 3 was a modified replication of Study 1. The training phase was exactly 
the same. As well, subjects were asked for frequency judgments for each case file. However, 
like Study 2, but not like Study 1, the final “all cues present” case file was dropped, leaving 
the six single cue case files and the six three-cue case files, for a total of twelve. Also, like in 
Study 2 but not Study 1, subjects in the Sleep condition were allowed to skip an anagram if, 
after ten seconds, they did not produce a solution. However, unlike either previous study, 
subjects' anagram performance was measured. This was to account for concern that there was 
no record that subjects in the Sleep condition were actually solving the word problems. As 
well, unlike either previous study, subjects in the Blink condition performed 90-second 
blocks of anagrams before each test case file. A summary of relevant comparisons to 




The average number of anagrams solved by each participant across all 12 90-
second blocks is plotted in Figure 10. A between-subjects t-test shows that Sleep solved 
marginally more anagrams (m=127.8; MSE=9.6) than Blink (m=106.5, MSE=8.6; 
t(58)=1.65, p=0.105, two-tailed). 
Mean Absolute Deviation
Comparing the average MAD score across all twelve test case files, between-
condition Student's T tests showed no significant effect of condition (Blink: m=17.89, 
MSE=1.65; Think: m=17.37, MSE=1.14; Sleep: m=19.14, MSE=1.03; all ps >0.2). The 
results were broken down by test case type, shown in Figure 11. Single cue test cases showed 
no overall difference between conditions (Blink: m=18.18, MSE=1.96; Think: m=17.40, 
MSE=1.16; Sleep: m=15.90, MSE=1.20; all ps >0.3). However, on multiple cue test cases 
Sleep (m=20.62, MSE=1.19) performed marginally worse than Blink (m=16.80, MSE=1.74; 
t(58)=1.51, p=0.136, two-tailed) and Think (m=17.35, MSE=1.41; t(64)=1.77, p=0.081, two-
tailed). 
Implied Choice Accuracy
Implied choices were derived along the same lines as in Study 1. Similar to MAD 
scores, Student's T-tests analyzing the pairwise between-condition comparisons showed that 
overall, there were no differences between conditions (Blink: m=0.78, MSE=0.036; Think: 
m=0.81, MSE=0.025; Sleep: m=0.76, MSE=0.024; all ps >0.15). These results were further 
52
Table 6: Summary of changes in decision context to adapt the manipulations of Dijksterhuis 
(2004) to the multiple cue probability learning task used in Study 3.
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90 s of anagrams, 
10 s w/ cue values 10 s, no information
Think
condition 100 s w/ cue values 240 s, no information
Sleep
condition
10 s w/cue values,
90 s of anagrams 240 s of anagrams
 
Figure 10: Average number of anagrams solved across 12 90-second blocks in Study 3. Sleep 
solved marginally more puzzles (m=127.8; MSE=9.6) than Blink (m=106.5, MSE=8.6).
54
Figure 11: Average MAD score of judgments by condition and test case type in Study 3. 
Single cue test cases showed no overall difference between conditions (Blink:
 m=18.18, MSE=1.96; Think: m=17.40, MSE=1.16; Sleep: m=15.90, MSE=1.20). However, 
on multiple cue test cases Sleep (m=20.62, MSE=1.19) performed marginally worse than 
Blink (m=16.80, MSE=1.74) and Think (m=17.35, MSE=1.41).
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analyzed as a function of test case file types, which is shown in Figure 12. While there were 
no significant differences between conditions for single cue test cases (Blink: m=0.77, 
MSE=0.048; Think: m=0.81, MSE=0.028; Sleep: m=0.81, MSE=0.026; all ps >0.4), on 
multiple cue test cases Sleep (m=0.72, MSE=0.035) was poorer at this measure of 
performance than both Blink (m=0.79, MSE=0.033; t(58)=1.49,  p=0.145, two-tailed) and 
Think (m=0.82, MSE=0.032; t(64)=2.04, p= 0.045, two-tailed).
Extremity
Extremity was calculated in the same manner as in Study 1. Between-condition 
Student's T tests showed no significant differences between conditions (Blink: m=-6.95, 
MSE=2.43; Think: m=-5.52, MSE=2.42; Sleep: m=-6.25, MSE=2.29; all ps >0.6). Again the 
results were broken down by case file type, shown in Figure 13. No significant differences 
were found between conditions in single high-diagnosticity cue case files (Blink: m=-7.01, 
MSE=3.47; Think: m=-4.71, MSE=2.91; Sleep: m=-4.93, MSE=3.23; all ps > 0.6), multiple 
cue case files (Blink: m=-10.06, MSE=2.00; Think: m=-9.65, MSE=2.60; Sleep: m=-10.73, 
MSE=2.66; all ps > 0.7), or single low-diagnosticity cue case files  (Blink: m=3.36, 
MSE=3.63; Think: m=2.84, MSE=3.52; Sleep: m=-3.58, MSE=3.80; all ps >0.19).
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Figure 12: Implied choice accuracy by test case file type in Study 3. While there were no 
significant differences between conditions for single cue test cases (Blink: m=0.77, 
MSE=0.048; Think: m=0.81, MSE=0.028; Sleep: m=0.81, MSE=0.026), on multiple cue test 
cases Sleep (m=0.72, MSE=0.035) was poorer at this measure of performance than both 
Blink (m=0.79, MSE=0.033) and Think (m=0.82, MSE=0.032).
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Figure 13: Between-condition comparisons of average judgment extremity in Study 3. Only 
test cases on which the implied choice would be accurate were included. No significant 
differences were found between conditions in single high-diagnosticity cue case files (Blink: 
m=-7.01, MSE=3.47; Think: m=-4.71, MSE=2.91; Sleep: m=-4.93, MSE=3.23), multiple cue 
case files (Blink: m=-10.06, MSE=2.00; Think: m=-9.65, MSE=2.60; Sleep: m=-10.73, 
MSE=2.66), or single low-diagnosticity cue case files  (Blink: m=3.36, MSE=3.63; Think: 
m=2.84, MSE=3.52; Sleep: m=-3.58, MSE=3.80).
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Discussion
The results of Study 3 stand in stark contrast to those of Study 1. Blink was no 
longer performing worse than Think and Sleep, and Sleep was marginally worse at multiple 
cue judgments than the other conditions, although the trend is not strong, especially in light 
of the first study. The only substantive change in the Sleep condition from Study 1 to Study 3 
– that subjects who were stuck on one anagram were able to switch to a new puzzle after ten 
seconds – was not predicted to have any effect on performance, and certainly not to only 
influence multiple cue judgments. These results are most parsimoniously explained as the 
result of random variation – replication is the hallmark of a relevant effect in experimental 
psychology and, in these studies, the combination of results from the two studies leads to an 
average effect size far too close to zero to be worth interpreting. Similar conclusions can be 
reached about the analysis of the extremity data. Having said that, the relative improvement 
in performance of the Blink condition compared to Think, may be of some interest. By 
having subjects in Blink solve anagrams before approaching the judgments, they may have 
been “warmed up” and better prepared to make probability judgments using analytical 
faculties. Alternatively, because they were now held in the experiment room , they may have 
seen less benefit from rushing though decisions (in terms of percentage of time spent in the 
lab) and so may have conceded to experimenters demands and given a better effort. Neither 
of these effects was predicted, but both agree with prevailing theories about problem solving, 
and may have theoretical implications.
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General Discussion
The three studies in this thesis demonstrate no evidence for a deliberation without 
attention effect. This was always a potential hazard for the experiment – Many studies, in 
paradigms even closer to Dijksterhuis’ original design, including direct replications, have 
failed to find an effect (see Acker, 2008). This task requires much more analytical processing 
than preference-based tasks that are typically used, and may not be amenable to the purely 
association-based, non-analytical unconscious networks to which the deliberation without 
attention effect is commonly ascribed. Payne et al (2009) have shown that introducing tiered 
diagnosticity in the cue structure eliminates the deliberation without attention effect, which 
suggests that Dijksterhuis’ (2006) initial prediction that increases in the complexity of a task 
lead to better relative performance of unconscious thought may be a simplistic view. A 
simpler, one-tiered multiple cue probability learning paradigm may better answer these 
questions. It may also be that deliberation without attention is vulnerable to repeated 
decisions. The same evidence may be useful (and therefore put to use) many times in this 
experiment, and this repeated retrieval and processing of stored memories about the task may 
block out any temporary benefits from unconscious organization of case file memories by the 
unconscious mind. If so, an effect might have been found had the manipulation been 
introduced before the test phase rather than during individual test case files. That is, if the 
learning phase was immediately followed by five minutes of deliberation (Think), five 
minutes of anagrams (Sleep), or nothing (Blink) right before the test cases (which would 
have to be identical across conditions), then memory organization might have been more 
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sensitive to the difference between forced deliberation and distraction. Deliberation without 
attention might require a minimum amount of time to make a practical difference on 
decisions, and the stop-and-start nature of the manipulations used, over the course of many 
decisions, may not have allowed the difference to emerge. Whatever the case, though, there 
is little room for conclusions to be made from the above studies about deliberation without 
attention.
However, some theoretical implications may be warranted. Comparing Studies 1 
and 3, the performance of those subjects given only ten seconds before being prompted for 
judgment improved, relative to the other groups, when they were given anagram puzzles for 
90 seconds in between test cases. Likewise, results from Study 2 suggest that Blink subjects 
responded much quicker than they had to, despite not having nearly as much pre-prompt time 
to go over their decision as other groups. This suggests that quick decisions suffer not only 
from performance deficits in more complex problems, but also for the meta-cognitive 
awareness, both to judge confidence and to allocate an appropriate amount of time to a 
problem. The improvement of judgments in this quick decision condition by having subjects 
do anagrams beforehand (in Study 3) may result either from activation of analytical 
resources for later use, akin to transfer inappropriate processing shifts (Schooler, 2002) or a 
more basic interpretation that, subjects who were forced to solve anagrams had less to gain 
from rushing through the judgments, as a percentage of the total time in the experiment. 
Whatever the underlying mechanism, it appears that cognitive effort may have momentum, 
and unlike a muscle, where previous effort depletes later ability, decisions may be improved 
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from expended effort beforehand. Obviously the data here are only suggestive, and further 
study is required.
The attempt to measure anagram performance was inconclusive, but did at least 
rule out the possibility that subjects were entirely neglecting the distractor task, something 
that, if it had been measured in previous studies, had not been mentioned in the resulting 
publications. However, the results are not conclusive, given the inherent variation in anagram 
solution speed over any amount of time. Some work recently has explored mind-wandering 
and off-task problem solving, but most of this work has focused on the prevalence and 
predictors of mind wandering episodes, and such work often uses thought probes and 
depends on subjects’ accurate and honest self-report of off-task thinking (Mason et al., 2007; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). However, trying to identify the content of those episodes 
might trigger a Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle dilemma whereby introspection might 
change how those episodes might otherwise be integrated into the decision. The sustained 
attention to response task – or SART – has a very high temporal resolution, with responses 
required roughly once a second, so drifting can at least be distinguished from thinking hard 
about the task (Robertson et al., 1997). Future study might instead use the SART as a 
distractor task.
A different multiple cue probability learning paradigm might also have been 
more fruitful. A more diverse set of test case files would have allowed for modeling of the 
decision strategies (see White, 2006). This would have required much more time and 
attention from subjects, but might have at least opened a larger window into subjects’ 
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understanding of the training set. As well, a different cue structure might be considered. The 
current structure was chosen for logistical reasons above all else (a similar version having 
been previously used in the same laboratory). Using Figure 1, taken from Dijksterhuis et al. 
(2006), as a guide, the task was intended to be as complex as was manageable given the time 
constraints on an experiment. This may have been a mistake, as even the author himself did 
not have enough of a grasp of the cue structure a priori to appreciate how various factors 
would come into play during the analysis.
That being said, the deliberation without attention effect was explored in a 
paradigm very different from previous studies, and a determination of the exact reason why 
Sleep did not outperform Think may not be warranted given the limited data for comparison. 
This investigation applied a reasonable approximation of Dijksterhuis’ principles of 
unconscious thought to a complex and well-known task, and found no evidence of the 
expected benefit of distraction in decision making. While some hypothetical multiple cue 
probability learning task might potentially be influenced by the effect, the above paradigms 
have outlined several tasks that are not. It is not unreasonable, however, to conclude that this 
is not a final word on the potency of deliberation without attention in multiple cue 
probability learning, and more study is needed to understand this fascinating phenomenon. 
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